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Prisoners Dilemma: The International Law and Policy Implications of Israel’s Detention
and Prisoner Exchange Practices
Adam Reich

I.

Introduction
In June 2006, Palestinian militants entered Israel through a 500-meter-long tunnel that

had been dug under Israel’s border with Gaza. 1 After entering Israeli territory, they killed two
soldiers. 2 The militants also seized a young Israeli soldier in the raid. 3 The soldier, Gilad Shalit,
was just 19 years old at the time. 4 Over the ensuing years, officials negotiated his release with
Hamas, finally securing it on October 18, 2011. 5 The Israeli public overwhelmingly showed a
desire to bring Shalit home, with 63% supporting the exchange deal brokered by the Israeli
government. 6
In situations like this, Israel isn’t negotiating with the government of another state. It is
forced to deal with terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. These organizations are
known as proxy groups because while they are non-state actors, they are believed to have
sponsorships from different Middle Eastern governments. As the old saying goes, actions have
consequences. In negotiating with these groups, Israel is paying a high price: to secure Shalit’s
return, Israeli officials agreed to release 1,027 Palestinian prisoners. 7
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Discussions about making such a deal invariably bring up discussions about how each
side handles its prisoners. My thesis is that Israel’s handling of prisoners and prisoner exchanges
must be changed because its current practices tarnish its image to the point of undermining its
standing internationally and its security at home. The international community holds Israel to
the high standards provided by the entirety of the Fourth Geneva Convention. While Israel
unquestionably has a need for security, the holding by the Israeli courts that the entirety of that
Convention is not binding on the handling of suspected terrorists held in administrative detention
is problematic. While the “humanitarian provisions” of the Convention are supposed to have
binding effect, that does not seem to play out in practice. Specifically, the conditions Israel
holds prisoners from proxy groups in do not conform to the humanitarian protections provided
by international law; some of its practices are questionable even under the relaxed standards
provided by Israeli domestic law. Consequently, if the Israeli government cannot abide by the
limits its own courts place on it, it cannot expect to get any latitude from the international
community when it comes to handing prisoners.
Beyond the image problem surrounding its handling of terror suspects in Israeli prisons,
its willingness to conduct large-scale releases of those terror suspects threatens its security.
Specifically, by engaging in prisoner exchanges with proxy groups to recover kidnapped
soldiers, Israel undermines its security.

The continuing ability to secure such deals does not

deter proxy groups from kidnapping Israeli soldiers. Indeed, negotiations have made these
kidnappings very lucrative for those groups.

Because of the danger of future kidnappings

continuing, Israel must change how it deals with proxy groups, but must do so in a way that will
hold up in the face of public pressure to bring home its soldiers.

3
This essay will start by providing an overview of the kidnapping problem, Israel’s
handing and exchange of prisoners accused of terrorist acts and the law governing those
practices. Part II will describe some of the prominent proxy groups involved in the kidnapping
of soldiers and negotiations with the Israeli government conditioning their release on the release
of terror suspects from Israeli prisons. Part III will discuss the provisions of international law
relevant to the holding of and exchanging of prisoners. Part IV look at the applicability of those
provisions and the consequences of Israel’s practices.

Part IV-A will look specifically at

congruence of Israel’s handling of these prisoners with international law. Part IV-B will focus
on the policy consequences of Israel engaging in prisoner exchanges. Specifically, it will discuss
the problem of “prisoner hyperinflation” that Israel has been experiencing in recent years, along
with proposals to counteract the phenomenon, evaluating their feasibility. This paper concludes
with a summary of the need for Israel to provide greater humanitarian protections for prisoners
held in Israeli jails and to change its policy of negotiating mass prisoner releases in exchange for
the return of Israeli soldiers, at least in the long run.
II.

The Proxy Groups
Hamas and Hezbollah are two of the more prominent groups that regularly carry out

attacks against Israel. Syria and Iran are believed use proxy groups like these to promote their
political goals in Israel. 8 The resources these states allegedly provide to these groups include
training, equipment and financial support. 9 In addition to the aforementioned forms of support,
Syria has also provided safe haven and logistical support to both leftist and Islamist Palestinian
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Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative Detention in Israel: Does A
Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists As Bargaining Chips?, 18 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 721, 742 (2001).
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hard-liners. 10 Using these groups can allow States to promote their political goals against Israel
without directly combating it. According to U.S. officials, Iran tends to back “Islamist groups,
like the Lebanese Shiite militants of Hezbollah (which Iran helped found in the 1980s) and
Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.” 11

Iran has long been considered to be

Hezbollah’s key arms supplier. 12 The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that Iran provides
somewhere between $100 million and $200 million in support each year. 13
Hezbollah carries out attacks against Israeli civilian targets on a regular basis. 14
Hezbollah also carries out attacks against the Israeli military, with one purpose being to secure
hostages. One example of this was an attack by Hezbollah members against an Israeli army
convoy on July 12, 2006. 15 Militants killed eight Israeli soldiers in the attack, while capturing
two soldiers with the stated purpose of using them as ‘bargaining chips” in an effort to secure the
release of three Lebanese members of Hezbollah detained by Israel. 16
In addition to Iran, Hezbollah receives the active support of Syria. 17 According to
experts, Iranian arms bound for Hezbollah regularly pass through Syria. 18 Hezbollah was also
able to carry out attacks against Israel from Lebanon because Syria allowed it to do so during its
effective occupation of that state from 1990 to 2005. 19
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Hamas is the other prominent proxy group that attacks Israel, and the group involved
with Gilad Shalit’s kidnapping and detention. In addition to the raid where it kidnapped Shalit, it
regularly attacks Israeli military and civilian targets alike. Hamas and its allies have conducted
rocket attacks against Israel, firing thousands of rockets into Israel. 20 Syria is also believed to
support Hamas, allegedly allowing them, along with other organizations like Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, to maintain headquarters in Damascus. 21
These proxy groups have flourished because of the support they receive from states. For
these groups, the ends have indeed justified the means. The kidnapping of Israeli soldiers is but
one example of a practice proxy groups engage in that runs counter to international law. When
one looks closely at their practices, it can readily be seen that these groups operate in a manner
that readily embraces actions which violate international law.
III.

Applicable Law
International law has a bearing on what state actors and non-state actors alike can and

cannot do. The rules and protections that govern a particular conflict may depend on what actors
are involved. The ends do not justify the means in international law; there are limits to what
states and non-state actors can do.

Practices like the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers are actions

that international law proscribes. Threshold rules exist for all, namely in the form of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Those continuing violations of international law show a
need for a change in policy on the part of the Israeli government when it comes negotiating with
proxy groups, because continuing negotiations have not deterred such violations.
States in Israel position, that deal with non-state actors like proxy groups, do not get a
blank check when provisions of international like the Third Geneva Convention don’t govern a
20
21

Rosen at 762.
Fletcher, supra.
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particular conflict. Additionally what a state controls has a bearing on what provisions of
international law it is subject to. For example, the influence Israel has over territories like the
Gaza Strip subject it to the requirements of Fourth Geneva Convention. Nevertheless, in practice
the Israeli government follows the interpretation of its domestic courts, which limit the
applicability of the Fourth Convention. However, the Israeli government’s practices toward
suspected terrorists arguably fall short of even the liberal interpretation provided by the Israeli
court. That gap in compliance harms Israel’s image and undermines support for it in the
international community.

For Israel to present a credible argument to the international

community that it deserves greater flexibility given its security situation, its government must
approach full compliance with the humanitarian protections provided by the Fourth Convention.
A. International Law
Various provisions of international law dictate conditions for managing prisoners,
including where they can be held and how they must be treated. The Geneva Conventions
dictate that captured combatants are entitled to general protection, humanitarian treatment in
captivity, and minimal respect. 22 They also establish clear conditions, including “where and how
a person may be held in captivity, the necessary food and medical treatment, the prohibition of
trial for activities carried out during the course of fighting, and many others.” 23
Hostilities between Israel and proxy groups, as non-international conflicts, are governed
by Common Article 3 of the Conventions. “In non-international conflicts, only Common Article
3 and the customary international law applicable in such conflicts will apply, including the

22
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Gross at 743.
Id.
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principles of humanity, proportionality, distinction, and necessity.” 24 It provides protections for
civilians and persons who are no longer involved in hostilities, including captured combatants.
Common Article 3 prohibits violence against these protected persons. 25 It also prohibits outrages
against their personal dignity and degrading or humiliating treatment and expressly prohibits the
taking of hostages. 26 Common Article 3 ensures that an impartial humanitarian body, like the
International Committee of the Red Cross, can offer its services to the parties involved in the
conflict. 27
Another important protection provided by Common Article 3 is a prohibition on the
taking of hostages. 28 Common Article 3 is not alone in proscribing such actions. The 1979
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages also criminalizes hostage-taking. 29
Specifically, it provides that:
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to
detain another person (…“hostage”) in order to compel a third party, namely, a
State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical
person, or a group of persons to do or to abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage, commits the offence of taking
of hostages. 30
It is important to note that, Article 12 of that convention states that it does not govern where the
1949 Geneva Conventions or 1977 Additional Protocols are controlling, insofar as those
conventions require states to prosecute or hand over the hostage-takers. 31 Article 34 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention also prohibits it, while Article 147 classifies hostage-taking as a
24

Laurie R. Blank, Understanding When and How Domestic Courts Apply IHL, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 205, 211
(2011).
25
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U.N.T.S. 135.
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Id.
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Customary IHL: Practice Relating to Rule 96. Hostage-Taking, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
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grave breach of the Convention. 32 Article 75(2)(c) of Protocol I prohibits the taking of hostages
“at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military
agents.” 33 The International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute also prohibits hostage taking, and
extends the prohibition to both international and non-international conflicts. 34
Much of the Fourth Geneva Convention addresses issues regarding the law of occupation,
including humanitarian access and rules governing the detention of civilians for security
reasons. 35 The Fourth Geneva Convention is relevant, given Israel’s status, as an occupying
power and a nation that regularly detains terror suspects. “[The Convention] outlines the rights
and duties of the occupying power (or belligerent occupant) and sets out the law of how civilian
populations are to be treated while the occupying power maintains effective control in the
occupied territory.” 36

The convention aims to protect basic political and human rights of

civilians under military occupation. 37
Article 49 prohibits transfers of protected individuals from occupied territory to the
territory of the Occupying Power or another country, absent reasons like security of the
population or imperative military reasons. 38 Article 76 is more specific, requiring protected
persons accused of offenses to be held in the occupied country. 39
Israel is often criticized for the conditions it holds prisoners in administrative detentions
in. Administrative detentions are authorized under Article 78 of the Fourth Convention as a tool
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to counteract a perceived immediate danger to state security or public order. 40 It is a measure
meant to be used only when absolutely necessary, with limits proscribed by Articles 42 and 78 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 75 of Protocol I. 41 Articles 27, 31-34, 64-79, 117 and
126 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also detail the rights of prisoners. 42 However, some of the
most recent controversies involve Article 116 of the Fourth Convention. While, Article 116
provides that internees should be allowed to “receive visitors, especially near relatives, at regular
intervals and as frequently as possible,” 43 Israel has not consistently allowed these visits; having
suspended the privilege for years in some cases.
Additional Protocol I, if controlling, would extend the application of the Third Geneva
Convention to the conflicts between Israel and proxy groups. Protocol I was drafted in 1979 to
add to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 44 A conflict between a non-state actor and a state actor is
considered a non-international conflict under the Third Geneva Convention, meaning that its
provisions would not govern: the addition of Protocol I to the original Geneva Conventions
allowed freedom fighters to be considered combatants, so long as they acted in accordance with
international law. 45 Under Article 96(3), such groups are not entitled to all the protections of the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I they formally accept all of the attendant obligations. 46
The proxy groups are considered paramilitary groups under Article 43(3) of Protocol I. 47
“Protocol I requires that freedom fighters not intermingle with the civilian population, wear
uniforms or other clear means of identification, and carry their weapons openly in order to ensure

40
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that other parties to the conflict know who they are fighting.” 48 Specifically, those requirements
come from Section (b) of Article 43(3). 49 A suspect who is caught without meeting section (b)’s
requirements is not entitled to a status as a lawful combatant and will not be treated as a prisoner
of war. 50 The combatant still must be treated humanely and must be tried by a regularly
constituted tribunal, as prescribed by the Geneva Conventions. 51

Article 44(3) makes an

exception to those conditions when the nature of the hostilities do not allow combatants to
effectively distinguish themselves. 52 However, it is understood that this not the type of conflict
where members of the proxy groups can rely on that exception.
Israel and the United States are among the nations which have not signed Protocol I,
because of concerns that giving it a binding effect would allow for terrorists to be recognized as
combatants. 53 Their concern is at least partially attributable to Article 51, which could provide
civilian status to insurgents and terrorists if they make themselves distinguishable from
civilians. 54 A specific fear with Article 51 is that it could create a “revolving door” effect by
allowing terrorists and insurgents to “engage in military operations and regain their immunity
from retaliation once the engagement is over.” 55

Essentially, Protocol I would require an

insurgent or terrorist to be disabled or killed while engaged in hostilities in order for a state to go
after them. The only other way would be for them to otherwise be amenable to criminal process
and trial. 56 In sum, the fear is that it would essentially permit “insurgents or terrorists to plan,

48
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equip, and train for future battles with impunity.” 57 As a result, the Third Convention is not
controlling, even when Protocol I’s expansion of the term “combatant” is considered.
In understanding the application of the rules of international law, it is important to look
beyond the text of the aforementioned parts of international law. Their application in practice
hinges on the willingness of sovereign states to abide by them. One factor that has a bearing on
the weight a particular state gives to provisions of international law is the effect given to them by
its domestic courts.
B. Israel’s Interpretation and Application of International Law
Israel’s domestic courts have had to consider the Geneva Conventions in judicial actions
taken by parties against the Israeli government. The interpretations by the Israeli courts have had
a bearing on the Israeli government’s handling of suspected terrorists. The courts have given the
Israeli government significant flexibility when it comes to the restrictions the Conventions would
place on its actions regarding suspected terrorists it holds in its prison.
The Israeli legal system classifies treaties signed by its government as either
“declaratory” or “constitutive.” 58

A declaratory treaty is one which codifies international

customary law; its provisions automatically become part of Israeli domestic law. 59

A

constitutive treaty is one which contains new international law. 60 Such a treaty is said to bind
Israel internationally, but not within its domestic system. 61 For the provisions of a constitutive

57
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943, 980 (1997).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 981.
61
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treaty to alter Israeli domestic law, it must be done by the legislative action of either the Knesset
or a Cabinet Minister delegated such authority by the Knesset. 62
The Third Geneva Convention is considered a declaratory treaty by the Israeli courts. 63
Nevertheless, the applicability of the Third Convention’s protections has depended on the courts’
interpretation of who is entitled to the Third Convention’s protections. Israel has consistently
taken the position that the forces of proxy organizations like Hezbollah should not be seen as
organizations which the Third Geneva Convention applies to. 64 The Israeli government contends
that because they do not conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war, Article 4 holds that the Third Geneva Conventions’ protections do not extend to their
operatives. 65 The Israeli Supreme Court has upheld this position. In Anon v. Minister of
Defence, the Court held that the petitioners, Lebanese citizens who were members of Hezbollah,
were properly denied protections as prisoners of war. 66 The organizations they were associated
with were considered paramilitary groups under Article 43(3) of Protocol I and the court
believed that even if the petitioners had complied with international rules, they could not get
POW status because with Lebanon disavowing responsibility for the organization, they could not
be considered combatants. 67
The Israeli Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Geneva Convention is a constitutive
treaty. 68 Consequently, Israeli courts do not consider it in evaluating challenges to actions taken
by the military government in occupied territories. 69 It has accepted that the Fourth Geneva
Convention applies only when a legitimate sovereign has been displaced, a theory known as the
62
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“missing reversionary” theory. 70 The Israeli government has stated that it does consider the
“humanitarian provisions” of the Fourth Geneva Convention when it comes to the occupied
Palestinian territory. 71 It has not elaborated on what provisions of the Convention it considers
“humanitarian provisions.” 72
What the Israeli Supreme Court has done is reviewed the actions of the Military
Administration in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), looking at substantive provisions of
the Fourth Convention. 73 Any rights for those in the occupied territories are instead derived
from the Hague Convention of 1907. 74 The Hague Convention is considered controlling because
it is considered a declarative treaty by the courts. 75 The Court has held that Article 49 of the
Fourth Convention, insofar as it proscribes individual deportations of persons constituting a
security threat, is not considered applicable to the OPT because it does not reflect customary
international law. 76 Examples of provisions the Court has held as applicable to the OPT include
“Article 23 (on free passage of humanitarian consignments, Article 64 (on penal legislation), and
Article 78 (on security measures and internment).” 77
Israel considers Hamas to be a terrorist organization and classifies its members as
terrorists. 78 Israeli courts reject the contention that Hamas members are freedom fighters. 79 The
courts routinely charge Hamas members with terrorism-related offenses utilizing Israeli domestic
law. 80 Israel defines an “unlawful combatant” in its Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law,
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enacted in 2002. 81 The law defines an “unlawful combatant” as “a person who participated,
whether directly or indirectly, in hostile acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force
perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel regarding whom the conditions stipulated in
international humanitarian law for granting prisoner-of-war status do not apply.” 82
The divergence of the Israeli interpretation of international law, notably the Fourth
Geneva Convention, from that various states and international bodies is what generates a lot of
the criticism of Israel’s handling of prisoners. This divergence poses a threat to its standing with
the international community.
IV.

Israel Must Change its Policies Toward Prisoners and Prisoner Exchanges to Secure
Its Standing Internationally and Protect Its Soldiers From Kidnappings
Israel’s policies toward prisoners, based on the interpretations by its domestic courts

serve to undermine its standing in the international community. This problem stems in large part
from the ambiguity behind what parts of the Fourth Geneva Convention the Israeli courts
consider “humanitarian provisions” and binding on the government. By holding the Fourth
Geneva Convention “constitutive,” rather than customary, the Israeli courts have left daylight
between its domestic law and the international community’s position, giving weight to
allegations that Israel’s policies violate the Conventions.
The problem goes beyond Israel’s standing in the international community. It goes to its
security. Repeated kidnappings of soldiers for use as bargaining chips by proxy groups, as
continuing violations of international law, show that Israel needs to change its policies because
its current practices do not provide an effective deterrent. Continuing negotiations with proxy
groups to secure the return of soldiers has created a phenomenon known as prisoner
81

Kevin Jon Heller, Israeli Supreme Court Upholds Unlawful Combatants Law, OPINIO JURIS (June 12, 2008, 12:21
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hyperinflation. Israel has had to pay an ever higher price to bring a soldier home; it has made
kidnappings a lucrative practice. To ensure the security of its soldiers, it much change how it
deals with proxy groups and find a way to deter these kidnappings.
A. For Israel’s Interpretation of its International Law Obligations to gain any
Credibility, it Must Clearly Define and Consistently Observe “Humanitarian
Provisions” of the Fourth Geneva Convention for Imprisoned Terror Suspects
When Israel engages a proxy group, whether in a conflict or in diplomacy, accusations
that each actor violates international law are invariably leveled by supporters of each side. When
those actors conduct a prisoner exchange, the criticism that circulates involves the handling and
treatment of those each side holds in captivity. The prominent criticisms directed at Israel
include its policies of moving prisoners from Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) into Israeli
territory and denying families of those prisoners access to visit those held in custody. Proxy
groups holding Israeli prisoners, on the other hand, face criticism for taking Israeli soldiers
captive in the first place and for denying humanitarian aid to those they detain.
Much of the controversy surrounding Israel’s practices relate to protections provided by
the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth Geneva Convention protects those under occupation.
Palestinian human rights groups criticized the Shalit deal, contending that Israeli demands to
deport some of the most dangerous terrorists to States more distant from its border, such as
Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates violated international law. 83 Palestinians contend
that the Fourth Convention applies to the OPT. 84 Critics of Israel’s policy assert that the
protections of the Fourth Geneva Convention are controlling in their entirety because of the
Israeli occupation in Gaza. Israel withdrew the last troops and vestiges of government presence

83
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on September 12, 2005. 85 Because of that 2005 withdrawal, some argue that the Gaza strip is no
longer occupied. 86 However, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon continues to consider Gaza
occupied by Israel. 87 Similarly, the organization Human Rights Watch still considers Gaza to be
occupied despite Israel’s 2005 withdrawal of troops and settlers. 88 This is because Israel still
controls Gaza’s airspace, marine access, and land borders, along with various utilities. 89 From a
legal standpoint, it is not necessary for the U.N. to acknowledge the absence of occupation in
Gaza. 90 Nevertheless, from a political standpoint, such recognition would allow Israel to avoid
being held to the more stringent legal standards required of occupiers by the Fourth
Convention. 91
The most significant part of the debate is not whether the Fourth Geneva Convention
applies at all, but whether it applies in its entirety. There is some support for Israeli law’s
position that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not customary international law. The Bush
Administration took a similar view, following the conclusion of the Goldsmith Memo, written by
Jack Goldsmith, who was at the time an Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal
Counsel. Goldsmith suggested that “operatives of international terrorist organizations were not
protected persons” for purposes of Article 49 of the Fourth Convention. 92 This was essentially
based on a narrow interpretation of the phrase “find themselves,” qualifying language in Article
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49. 93 Goldsmith argued that Roman law viewed deportations as removal from one’s home
country and denying them the right of citizenship. 94 In effect, a terror suspect whose presence in
the territory could not be considered happenstance or coincidence could not be a “protected
person.” 95

On the basis of that conclusion, the U.S. has transferred terror suspects out of

territory it occupies. 96
Outside of the United States, that narrow interpretation of Article 49’s protections has
largely been rejected.

Particularly noteworthy was the U.K. Supreme Court’s decision in

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs v. Rahmatullah. In that decision, the
U.K. Supreme Court explicitly rejected Goldsmith’s argument, believing that using happenstance
or coincidence as a prerequisite would introduce an unwarranted restriction on the availability of
the Convention’s protections. 97 While it did not have the power to release him, as the United
States continued to hold him, the Court found a prima facie breach of Article 49 in the transfer of
Rahmatullah from Iraq to Afghanistan. 98

This view of a key U.S. ally, along with the

aforementioned positions of the U.N. and various human rights organizations of Israel’s
influence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank make it difficult to avoid applying provisions of
the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. “[M]ost of the world
community adopts the view that Israel's maximum legal claim to Palestinian territories is based

93

2004 O.L.C. Memo, supra. at 1.
Pamela Hess, Iraq Transfers War Crimes?, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Oct. 26, 2004,
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article7159.htm.
95
2004 O.L.C. Memo, supra. at 12.
96
Kevin Jon Heller, UK Supreme Court Rejects Jack Goldsmith’s Interpretation of GC IV, Opinio Juris, (Nov. 1,
2012, 10:50 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/11/01/uk-supreme-court-rejects-jack-goldsmiths-interpretation-of-gciv/.
97
Id.
98
Id.
94

18
on its control pursuant to the law of belligerent occupation, which imposes duties under the
Hague and Fourth Geneva Conventions.”99
However, where Israel conditions the release of terrorists from its prisons on their
subsequently being deported from neighboring Palestinian territory, it’s difficult to believe that
such conduct was truly what the framers of the Fourth Convention meant to prohibit in Article
49. The commentary for Article 49 discusses the “deportations” of World War II as being the
central consideration of the authors in drafting that article. 100 This includes Nazi atrocities of
mass transfers, such as trains to Auschwitz and individual transfers, such as “Night and Fog,”
where captured French resistance fighters were taken to Nazi camps. 101 Conflicts have changed
since the Geneva Conventions came into being in 1949, with asymmetrical conflicts being more
commonplace now. While there have been some attempts update the Conventions with the
Additional Protocols and fill in some of the remaining gaps in international law, some linger.
This is particularly true when one considers the continuing threat such individuals would pose to
the security of Israeli soldiers and civilians, namely with regards to cross-border raids, as
compared to the circumstances of World War II.
At the same time, Israel does need to do more to show a continuing commitment to
humanitarian rights. Israel’s handling of conditions for administrative detentions is problematic
because some of the actions its government has taken rightfully leave Israeli authorities open to
legitimate criticism on humanitarian grounds. Among the problems in administrative detentions
are holding prisoners without charges, holding them in solitary confinement and denying family
visits to prisoners. International humanitarian law requires detainees held by Israel in relation to
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the armed conflict to have a right to family visits. As mentioned, Article 116 provides that
internees should be allowed to “receive visitors, especially near relatives, at regular intervals and
as frequently as possible.” 102 For a period of almost five years, beginning in June 2007, Israel
suspended family visits for Palestinians from Gaza. 103

The measure affected over 800

detainees. 104 The condition was one factor that led to a mass hunger strike by 1,600 Palestinian
prisoners seeking improved conditions and restoration of rights suspended while Gilad Shalit
was held captive in Gaza. 105 The Israeli government finally agreed to let family visits resume in
July 2012. 106
As stated previously, under its domestic law, Israel does consider itself bound by the
humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. If the interpretations by its domestic
courts regarding what obligations the Israeli government must abide by under international law
are to gain any legitimacy in the global realm, authorities must show that they take their
humanitarian obligations seriously.
Managing prisoners from proxy groups has caused more than just image problems for
Israel. A more immediate danger comes from its willingness to conduct mass-prisoner releases
in exchange for the return of kidnapped Israeli soldiers. To ensure the security of its soldiers,
Israel must consider a policy change on prisoners as well.
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B. Israel Must Change How It Negotiates with Proxy Groups if it is to Counteract
“Prisoner Hyperinflation” and Deter Future Kidnappings of its Soldiers
A clear and present danger to the security of Israel comes from its government’s
willingness to agree to mass releases of imprisoned terrorists in exchange for the return of Israeli
soldiers. Israel’s practice of exchanging prisoners with proxy groups to secure the release of its
own soldiers has proven to be popular with its citizens. Nevertheless, it undermines Israel’s long
term security by encouraging these groups to continue kidnapping soldiers, given that
negotiations in these circumstances have become very beneficial for them. As mentioned, the
kidnapping of Israeli soldiers is a continuing violation of international law on the part of proxy
groups. The trend of “prisoner hyperinflation,” where Israel pays an increasingly higher cost for
each citizen it brings home in deals with such groups, shows that a change needs to be made on
the part of the Israeli government. Rather than deterring kidnappings of soldiers, Israel has made
them a lucrative practice for proxy groups. The Israeli government has recognized this and
recently signaled that it will change how it deals with those groups in such situations.
Negotiations with proxy groups have helped bring captives like Shalit home, but there is
no denying Shalit’s release, like similar bargains by Israel in recent memory, came at a high cost.
Among the 1,027 prisoners released from Israeli prisons were Amna Muna, Ahlam Tamimi, and
Walid Anjes. 107 Muna was charged for luring a 16-year-old Israeli boy via the internet to
Ramallah, who was then shot to death by two Fatah terrorists. 108 Tamimi and Anjes were
involved in attacks which scores of civilians were injured and several killed at attacks at
restaurants in Jerusalem. 109
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The decisions of Israeli authorities to continue negotiating with these proxy groups has
contributed to larger problem, dubbed “prisoner hyperinflation.”

Israeli-Arab prisoner

exchanges have been occurring since 1948, but in the 1980s, Israel began paying a high price for
prisoners. 110 The first such negotiation resulting in a mass release of prisoners was the “Jibril
Deal” with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 111 In the Jibril Deal, Israel released
1,150 Palestinian poltical prisoners in exchange for three Israeli soldiers held by the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 112 Israel and Hezbollah made three exchange deals
in June 1996, June 1998, and June 2004. 113 The June 2004 deal was the largest with Hezbollah,
with Israel releasing 436 prisoners in exchange for the return of the remains of three Israeli
soldiers and the release of an individual Hezbollah claimed was an Israeli intelligence officer. 114
In Gilad Shalit’s release, Israel paid the highest “price,” releasing 1,027 prisoners in exchange
for his return. 115 The steady increase in the number of prisoners Israel has been paying to secure
the return for each one of its citizens is why the price paid in release deals is said to be
increasing, and why the phenomenon is called prisoner hyperinflation.
Israel is understandably looking to combat prisoner hyperinflation. Lawmakers and
experts alike have put forth proposals to address the problem. A Likud lawmaker proposed a
reduction of the prisoner-swap exchange rate by 10% to 20% each time a deal is struck. 116
Another proposal by counter-terrorism expert Boaz Ganor involves creating a new framework to
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limit who could be released in an exchange with a proxy group. 117 The framework would
differentiate between “terrorists” who harm civilians and “guerillas” who harm soldiers.118
Terrorists would not be freed until they finished their sentences, while guerillas would be held in
prisoner of war camps run in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, and would be fair game
for prisoner exchanges. 119 Guerillas still imprisoned at the time of a peace deal could go free
when such a peace deal is executed. 120
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak commissioned a report in 2008, the findings of
which were released in late 2011. 121 The body that drafted the report was known as the Shamgar
Commission. The Commission was assembled in 2008 after Israel had agreed to release four
Hezbollah fighters and the bodies of approximately 200 Lebanese and Palestinians in order to
secure the return of two bodies of Israeli soldiers to Israel. 122 It recommended that Israel cease
large-scale prisoner exchanges. 123 Barak wanted a policy to make clear to both opposing forces
and the Israeli public what prices Israel would, and would not, be willing to pay in the future.124
He also was concerned that the exchanges had undermined Israeli deterrence. 125 Indeed, the
kidnapping of Israeli soldiers for use as bargaining chips remains a concern. The Israeli Defense
Force has expressed concern that a number of tunnels being dug along the Israeli border with
Gaza could be used to execute the kidnapping of another soldier in a cross-border raid. 126
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The Shamgar Commission’s conclusions reflect an important realization by the Israeli
Government that prisoner exchanges, while politically popular pose a long-term threat to the
security of Israel’s forces.

The idea that the prisoner exchanges can be lucrative for proxy

groups is not just theoretical; it is reality, as demonstrated by the prisoner hyperinflation
phenomenon that has occurred since 1985. As such, it is in Israel’s best interest to curb these
exchanges, if not ceasing them entirely.
Such a decision would not be without consequences. There is no guarantee that it would
lead proxy groups to stop trying to kidnap Israeli soldiers. Indeed, a critique of trying to have the
Shamgar Commission develop a formula to restrain Israel’s ability to negotiate with such groups
is that it has no real chance of influencing actors like Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. 127 The
concern is that because they know Israel could turn around and choose to negotiate after all, they
may still continue trying to kidnap troops to use as bargaining chips. 128 All things considered,
the Commission’s proposals are worth following because even if such a policy change ends up
being more symbolic than anything else, it still communicates a meaningful message to proxy
groups that the status quo is no longer acceptable.
Prison exchange agreements have been met with some resistance domestically.

For

example, in the prisoner exchange that led to Gilad Shalit’s release, relatives of terror victims
unsuccessfully attempted to get the Supreme Court of Israel to block the prisoner swap. 129
Nevertheless, political pressures may pose a greater problem with the dramatic shift in direction.
A poll conducted in June 2011, around the time of the Shalit exchange, showed that
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approximately 63% of the Israeli public supported the deal made by the Israeli government. 130
Such broad support for the practice of mass prisoner releases could conceivably create difficulty
if the government were to refuse to engage in negotiations with proxy groups in near future.
The fact that a solid majority of Israelis seem to support the practice could create political
pressure on the government officials that have to deal with future kidnappings of Israeli soldiers,
and push them towards negotiations. The fact that the Israeli government delayed releasing the
findings of the Shamgar Commission’s report until Gilad Shalit was brought home 131 suggests
that it may recognize the potential unpopularity such a policy may experience if Israeli soldiers
are taken captive, at least in the near future. In that sense, the political pressure could lead to a
quick reversal of the policy change advocated by the Shamgar Commission. Consequently,
while the Commission’s suggestion may be the ideal position when it comes to deterring proxy
groups from conducting a cross-border raid to try to collect new bargaining chips, it may not be
the most realistic one to hold up in practice, given public sentiment. Instead, at least in the
interim, it may be more practical to create a framework to counteract the prisoner hyperinflation
occurring in recent years.
Of the other two proposals mentioned, the reclassification option has the advantage of
curbing some of the concerns with prisoner exchanges at the present time, while giving the
Israeli government a degree of flexibility when negotiating with proxy groups in the future.
While the gradual reduction of the number of prisoners that can be released in an exchange deal
might also be effective, if it proves too rigid as the number of prisoners the government can
release decreases over time, it may crack under public pressure as well. Classifying prisoners
into two distinct groups avoids some of the problems of the other two solutions because it give
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the government flexibility in terms of the number of prisoners it could choose to release in any
deal, while keeping the prisoners with the greatest potential to commit future hostile acts towards
protected groups like civilians out of any potential bargain.
As the advocate for the reclassification policy, Boaz Ganor points out, if executed
properly it can be carried out in such a way that a proxy group might be forced to accept a deal
where “guerillas” but not “terrorists” are released. Ganor suggested publishing the names of the
Israeli-held prisoners being offered and setting up a broadcast on television where the prisoners
could make a case for their freedom. By holding firm to these distinctions and Israel and using
strong propaganda, Israel could get the groups to accept an exchange only involving “guerillas”
for Israelis. In addition to solving the problem of releasing those who kill civilians, it could help
keep the violence directed towards the military and away from civilians.
While on its face this option would not have the same deterrence value as the Shamgar
Commission’s recommendation that no negotiations take place whatsoever, it may prove to be a
more sustainable one while public opinion leans in favor of negotiating an exchange with proxy
groups. In the long run, not negotiating prisoner releases would have the highest deterrence
value to these groups, but only when public opinion is willing to support it can it truly succeed.
If public opinion were to shift against mass prisoner releases for Israelis overall, then a policy
such as the Shamgar Commission’s proposal could be put into effect at a later date.
V.

Conclusion
When it comes to dealing with imprisoned terror suspects, Israel faces an image problem

on two fronts.

By deviating from the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding some of the

conditions it holds its prisoners in, Israel leaves itself open to criticism that undermines its
support in the international community; a problem which is magnified by ambiguities in its
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domestic interpretations are regarding its obligations under international law. By showing a
willingness to conduct large-scale prisoner release to bring kidnapped soldiers home, Israel has
weakened its standing relative to proxy groups, rather than deterring those groups from
conducting such kidnappings.
With Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, a lot of the controversies over its
practices naturally stem from the Fourth Geneva Convention. While Israeli law holds that only
the humanitarian provisions of the Convention bind its government, the international community
is skeptical of such an assertion. This division may reflect how the changing nature of conflicts
has created certain gaps in the original 1949 Conventions, even with some of the efforts to
update them.

However, for Israel’s domestic interpretation of its obligations to gain any

credibility in the international community, it must do more when it comes to holding prisoners in
humane conditions, namely in ways like ensuring that family visits are not suspended for years at
a time.
From a policy standpoint, Israel’s willingness to negotiate prisoner exchanges with proxy
groups has created challenges. While negotiating undermines Israel’s ability to deter groups
from carrying out cross-border raids to secure new “bargaining chips,” broad public support in
Israel for deals to secure the return of that nation’s soldiers has often forced the Israeli
government to negotiate with those groups, and conduct mass prisoner releases in the process.
Israel remains caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. It must do what it
can to combat attacks and attempts at kidnapping its soldiers by proxy groups even if it means
contending with public pressure to make deals to bring its kidnapped soldiers home. Over time,
the relative price Israel has had to pay for each Israeli soldier has increased significantly,
resulting in the problem of “prisoner hyperinflation.”
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When a proxy group does succeed in kidnapping members of the Israeli military, Israel
must try to effectively deter future kidnappings. For the foreseeable future, since political
pressure may make it difficult for Israel to stop agreeing to mass-prisoner releases for the return
of its soldiers, it must consider other ways to improve its position in these situations. Using a
framework where prisoners are classified as either “terrorists” or “guerillas,” where only the
latter group, defined as those who target military forces rather than civilians, can be released in
any negotiations with a proxy group may be a more viable option. By allowing the government
to continue to have some flexibility in negotiating with these groups, while also creating a
framework that ensures the offenders who are most dangerous to the civilian population will not
be released, Israel can improve its bargaining position and limit the potential dangers in agreeing
to prisoner exchanges with proxy groups.

